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Abstract
Part I of this Note will briefly examine the history of United States immigration policy, high-
lighting major legislation, to illustrate the increasingly complex and restrictive approach adopted
by the United States toward aliens. Part II will focus on the predecessors of the proposed guest
worker program, the “Bracero” program and, to a lesser extent, the ”H-2” program. Part III will
present a critical review of the President’s guest worker program and its legislative counterparts
in greater detail underscoring their similarities and differences. Finally, Part IV will posit some
conclusions concerning the President’s program and offer suggestions for improvement.
A CRITIQUE OF PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT
INTRODUCTION
On June 8 and 9, 1981 President Reagan met with President
Jos6 Lopez Portillo of Mexico to discuss the mutual concerns of their
countries.' One topic of importance to both Presidents was the
ineffectively controlled immigration of Mexicans into the United
States.2  Prior to these meetings, President Reagan's White House
staff had developed a series of detailed proposals to deal with this
problem. 3  Although announcement was delayed by the Reagan
Administration, 4 the proposals advocate allowing continually resi-
dent illegal aliens5 to apply for permanent resident status,6 along
with establishing a guest worker program that would allow Mexi-
can citizens to work in the United States on a temporary basis..7
1. N.Y. Times, June 8, 1981, at Al, col. 3.
2. Clearly, problems other than immigration were important to both countries. Issues
such as United States interference in Central American affairs, in general, and United States
involvement in El Salvador, in particular, were more pressing than the immigration ques-
tion. Weisman, U.S. Expecting Talks to Strengthen Ties with Mexico, N.Y. Times, June 8,
1981, at A10, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Weisman Article].
3. See Pear, Plan Would Let Mexicans Work As U.S. Guests, N.Y. Times, May 10,
1981, at Al, col. 5 [hereinafter cited as Guest Worker Article]. See notes 89-163 infra and
accompanying text.
4. "The Administration has been searching for ways to deal with the immigration
problem since President Reagan took office. . . .But not wanting to divert attention from its
economic recovery program, the Administration delayed an announcement of its immigra-
tion policy." Pear, White House Asks A Law To Bar Jobs For Illegal Aliens, N.Y. Times, July
31, 1981, at Al, col. 6.
5. Id. The terms "illegal alien" and "illegal immigration" will be used throughout this
Note. The term "undocumented alien" has also been used in the same sense as the term
"illegal alien". See, e.g., Bevilacqua, Legal Critique OJ President Carter's Proposals On
Undocumented Aliens, 23 CATH. LAW. 286 (1978). An illegal alien is described as "[a]ny
alien who (1) enters the United States at any time or place other than as designated by
immigration officers, or (2) eludes examination or inspection by immigration officers, or (3)
obtains entry to the United States by a willfully false or misleading representation or the
willful concealment of a material fact. ... 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1978).
6. See text accompanying notes 104-07 infra. The terms "permanent" and "residence"
are defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(31), (33) (1976).
7. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY 4 (July 30, 1981)
[hereinafter cited as President's Program]. Some have criticized this prong of the proposal as
being little more than a thinly disguised revival of the Bracero program. See McQuillan,
Trying an Old Approach on IllegalAliens, N.Y. Daily News, June 21, 1981, at 37, col. 1. The
Bracero program admitted several million Mexican laborers, or "braceros", into the United
States to work directly for domestic employers from 1942 to 1965. Id.
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Civil penalties would also be imposed against employers who
knowingly hire illegal aliens. 8 The purpose of these proposals" is to
allow the United States to regain control over immigration at the
Mexican border. 10 Whether the President's proposed program can
achieve this purpose is questionable.
Although statistical estimates of the number of illegal aliens in
this country are unreliable, it is believed that the granting of per-
manent resident status to all illegal aliens continually resident in the
United States for the past ten years would affect well over one
million persons." The impact may be even greater when special
provisions for Cuban and Haitian refugees and illegal aliens not in
this country before January 1, 1980 are considered.' 2
The purpose of this Note is to produce a cogent and concise
critique of the President's proposals. Because the entire program
must eventually be approved by Congress, reference will also be
made to relevant legislation introduced into recent sessions of both
the House of Representatives and the Senate. It,is hoped that a
comparison of these proposals and the Bracero program will facili-
tate an understanding of the strengths and weakness of the guest
worker program. Part I of this Note will briefly examine the history
of United States immigration policy, highlighting major legislation,
to illustrate the increasingly complex and restrictive approach
8. President's Program, supra note 7, at 4. The civil fines would be $500 to $1,000 for
each illegal alien hired. Injunctions would also be imposed upon those employers who take
part in a "pattern or practice" of hiring illegal aliens. Id. These concepts will be discussed in
greater detail at notes 145-52 infra and accompanying text.
9. There are other parts to the President's proposal but they are less significant. These
provisions will be briefly discussed at notes 164-71 infra and accompanying text.
10. As the United States Attorney General William French Smith recognized, "We have
lost control of our borders. We have pursued unrealistic policies. We have failed to enforce
our laws effectively." Testimony of William French Smith, Attorney General Before the
Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy and the House Subcommittee on
Immigration, Refugees and International Law 1 (July 30, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Attor-
ney General's statement].
11. See Note, Illegal Immigration: Short-Range Solution of Employer Sanctions, 49
Miss. L.J. 659, 663 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Employer Sanctions].
12. See text accompanying note 104 infra. The final program may also allow illegal
aliens who did not live in this country before January 1, 1980 to remain in the United States
under a special temporary status that would allow these persons to eventually gain perma-
nent status. 127 CONG. REc. S1689, S1690 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1981) (statement of Senator
Kennedy on Report of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy). The
President's proposal does not include such a provision, however, this special status would
seem to be justified for the same reasons as the general amnesty provision. See notes 106-07
infra and accompanying text.
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adopted by the United States toward aliens. Part II will focus on
the predecessors of the proposed guest worker program, the "Bra-
cero" program and, to a lesser extent, the "H-2" program. 13  Part
III will present a critical review of the President's guest worker
program and its legislative counterparts in greater detail under-
scoring their similarities and differences. Finally, Part IV will posit
some conclusions concerning the President's program and offer sug-
gestions for improvement.
I. LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS UPON IMMIGRATION
A. Early Development
The first law regulating immigration into the United States
was the Alien and Sedition Act of 1798.14 This legislation empow-
ered the President to deport aliens deemed "dangerous" to the
United States. 15  The statute was allowed to expire two years
later.' For the next seventy-five years, no major federal law was
passed restricting the flow of immigration. 7  However, this did not
mean that the concept was not considered. The large number of
Irish Catholics immigrating into this country in the 1830's caused
renewed concern for our immigration policy.18 Although no spe-
cific legislation was enacted at that time, the proposals of this
period served as models for later legislation. 19
Steadily increasing numbers of immigrants, along with a cor-
responding clamor from United States citizens for some type of
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii) (1976).
14. Alien and Sedition Act, ch. 58, § 1, 1 Stat. 570 (1798) (repealed 1800). The statute,
in relevant part, states:
That it shall be lawful for the President of the United States at any time during
the continuance of this act, to order all such aliens as he shall judge dangerous to the
peace and safety of the United States, or shall have reasonable grounds to suspect
are concerned in any treasonable or secret machinations against the government
thereof, to depart out of the territory of the United States ....
Id.
15. Id.
16. The primary reason for this was the unpopularity of the Act. See C. GORDON & H.
ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1.2a (rev. ed. 1981).
17. Legislation was passed during this period facilitating the immigration process. Id.
At this time, the Immigration Act of 1862, ch. 27, 12 Stat. 340 (1862) (repealed 1882), was
also passed. Its purpose was to prohibit the importation of Oriental slave labor. This particu-
lar law was only an early part of an attempt to control the importation of cheap foreign labor
into this country. The contract labor problem of this period is discussed at note 23 infra.
18. E. HARPER, IMMIGRATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, 5 (3d ed. 1975).
19. Id.
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regulation, caused Congress to pass the Immigration Act of 1875.20
This law, the first qualitative restriction on immigration, excluded
prostitutes and alien convicts from admission to this country.21
Similar restrictions were enacted by the Immigration Law of 188222
to exclude lunatics, idiots and those liable to become public
charges.13
The Immigration Law of 189124 added to the class of inadmis-
sible aliens those suffering from loathsome or contagious diseases,
polygamists, paupers, those whose passage was paid by another and
aliens convicted of crimes of moral turpitude. 25  In 1903, 2 persons
who were epileptics, idiots, those who had been insane within five
years of entry or those who had previously experienced two attacks
of insanity, professional beggars and those importing women for
prostitution were excluded .27 Anarchists were also excluded from
entry by this act. 28  In 1907, when immigration was at an all-time
20. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, § 5, 18 Stat. 477 (1875) (current version at 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a) (1976)).
21. Id.
22. Immigration Law of 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214 (1882) (current version at 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1976)).
23. Despite these restrictions, immigration for the period 1881-90 exceeded 4.7 million
persons. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, ILLEGAL ALIENS: PROB-
LEMS AND POLiciEs 2 (1978) [hereinafter cited as ILLEGAL ALIENS]. At this time a growing
practice developed among American employers to import cheap foreign labor. E. HAm'E,
supra note 18, at 6. These laborers performed difficult physical tasks and some complained
that this practice lowered the overall standard of American labor. Id. Congress, realizing
that this was an affront to the human dignity of both foreign and domestic laborers, enacted
the Alien Contract Labor Law, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332 (1885) (current version at 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(14) (1976)), which made it illegal to import aliens into the United States under a
contract for the performance of labor or service. Exceptions were made for aliens temporarily
in the United States, artists, lecturers, servants and skilled laborers working in an industry
not yet established in the United States. Id. § 5, 23 Stat. at 333. This Act was amended by the
Act of Oct. 19, 1888, ch. 1210, 25 Stat. 565, 566 (1888), which for the first time expelled
aliens who violated the contract labor laws. The constitutionality of the Alien Contract
Labor Law was specifically upheld in Lees v. United States, 150 U.S. 476 (1893).
24. Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084 (1891) (current version at 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1976)).
25. Id.
26. Immigration Act of 1903, ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213 (1903).
27. Id. § 2, 32 Stat. at 1214.
28. Id. The langauge of the statute makes "anarchists, or persons who believe in or
advocate the overthrow by force or violence of the government. . . or of all forms of law, or
the assassination of public officials ..." subject to exclusion. This provision is noteworthy
because it was the first statute permitting exclusion of an individual on the grounds of his or
her opinions. The Anarchist Act of 1918, ch. 186, § 2, 40 Stat. 1012 (1918) further provided
for the deportation of alien anarchists and radicals.
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high,2 19 further restrictions were enacted by Congress excluding
imbeciles, feeble-minded persons, tubercular aliens, those suffering
from physical or mental defects affecting their ability to earn a
living, those admitting crimes involving moral turpitude, women
coming into this country for an immoral purpose and children
under sixteen unaccompanied by their parents. 30
All of the aforementioned restrictions were codified by the
Immigration Act of 1917,'31 which also contained a literacy require-
ment and established a barred zone. The literacy requirement pro-
hibited from admission aliens over the age of 16 who could not
read.32  The "barred zone" provision excluded from admission per-
sons from almost all of the Asian Continent. 33
After the First World War, far more people wished to enter
the United States than the government was willing to allow. As a
result, Congress enacted the First Quota Law of 1921. 34  This act
restricted annual immigration to three per cent of the number of
foreign born persons of that nationality living in the United States
in 1910.
In 1924, the First Quota Law was supplanted by the National
Origins Act, 35 a permanent quota restriction which reduced the
annual quota of immigrants to two per cent of the number of
foreign born persons of such nationality resident in the United
States in 1890.36 By its provisions, this quota was to remain in
29. The total number of immigrants coming into the United States from 1901-10 was
almost 9 million persons. ILLEGAL ALIENS, supra note 23, at 2.
30. Immigration Act of 1907, ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 898 (1907) (current version at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a) (1976)).
31. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874 (1917) (repealed 1952).
32. Id. § 3, 39 Stat. at 875-76.
33. Section 3 of this Act state:
That the following classes of aliens shall be excluded from admission into the
United States: . .. persons . .. who are natives of any country, province, or
dependency situate on the Continent of Asia west of the one hundred and tenth
meridian of longitude east from Greenwich and east of the fiftieth meridian of
longitude east from Greenwich and south of the fiftieth parallel of latitude
north....
Id. See E. HARPER, supra note 18, at 10.
34. Immigration Act of 1921, ch. 8, § 2(a), 42 Stat. 5 (1921) (repealed 1952). The
ceiling on total immigration under this Act was approximately 350,000 persons. E. HARPER,
supra note 18, at 11. Previous legislation concerning qualitative restrictions also remained in
effect. Id.
35. Immigration Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (1924).
36. Id. § 11(b), 43 Stat. at 159. The total number of persons permitted to immigrate
annually under this Act was reduced to 165,000. E. HARPER, supra note 18, at 13.
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effect until 1929 when a national origins quota system would be
used to regulate immigration.3 7  This later provision remained in
effect through 1952.38
B. Present Statutory Framework
The Immigration and Nationality Act of June 27, 195239 was
the product of an extensive re-evaluation of immigration law and
policy. 40 This act remains the cornerstone of United States immi-
gration law. While recodifying much of the 1917 and 1924 acts, the
Immmigration and Nationality Act significantly modified several
provisions as well. First, the national origins quota was modified to
admit aliens at a rate of 1/6 of one per cent of the number of
inhabitants in the United States in 1920 whose national origin was
attributable to that area. 4' Second, a preference system was estab-
lished giving priority to skilled aliens whose services were urgently
needed in the United States. 42 Third, it eliminated race and sex as
a criteria for exclusion. 43  Interestingly, the quota restrictions did
not apply to Western Hemisphere immigration. 44
The provisions of the 1952 act remained largely unchanged
until amended by Congress in 1965. 45 The 1965 amendments abol-
ished the national origins quota system, eliminated the last vestiges
of racial discrimination from immigration law, altered the selection
system to give greater weight to family reunification 4 and, for the
first time, established a numerical ceiling of 120,000 persons on
Western Hemisphere immigration. 47 Also, an annual limitation on
Eastern Hemisphere immigration was set at 170,000 persons with a
37. See Congressional Research Service, U.S. Immigration Law And Policy: 1952-79 at
7 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Congressional Research Service]. Under this system, the annual
quota for any country or nationality had the same relation to 150,000 as the number of
inhabitants in the United States in 1920 having that national origin had to have the total
number of inhabitants in 1920. Id.
38. E. HARPER, supra note 18, at 13.
39. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101-1551 (1976)).
40. Congressional Research Service, supra note 37, at 5.
41. § 201(a), 66 Stat. at 175 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) (1976)).
42. Id. § 203(a), 66 Stat. at 178-79.
43. See E. HARPER, supra note 18, at 21. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) (1976).
44. Congressional Research Service, supra note 37, at 7.
45. Immigration and Nationality Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911
(1965).
46. Id. § 201(e), 79 Stat. at 911.
47. Id. § 21(e), 79 Stat. at 921.
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per country limitation of 20,000.48 In 1976, the act was further
amended so that the preference system and per country limitation
applied equally to both Eastern and Western Hemisphere immigra-
tion. 49
More recently, Congress passed the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act of 1978.50 This law combined the Eastern and Western
Hemisphere ceilings into one world-wide quota of 290,000 per-
sons. 51 It also applied the preference system equally to all persons
admissible under this ceiling. 52  Furthermore, it established a Se-
lect Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy.-
3
48. Id. §§ l(a), 2(a), 79 Stat. at 911-12.
49. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571, 90
Stat. 907 (1976).
50. Immigration and Nationality Act of Oct. 5, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-412, 92 Stat. 907
(1978).
51. Id. § 201(a), 92 Stat. at 907.
52. Id.
53. Id. § 4(a), 92 Stat. at 907. The act states in part:
(c) It shall be the duty of the Commission to study and evaluate, in accordance
with subsection (d), existing laws, policies, and procedures governing the admission
of immigrants and refugees to the United States and to make such administrative
and legislative recommendations to the President and to the Congress as are appro-
priate.
(d) In particular, the Commission shall-
(1) conduct a study and analysis of the effect of the provisions of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act (and administrative interpretations thereof) on (A) social,
economic, and political conditions in the United States; (B) demographic trends; (C)
present and projected unemployment in the United States; and (D) the conduct of
foreign policy;
(2) conduct a study and analysis of whether and to what extent the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act should apply to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the
Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the
other territories and possessions of the United States;
(3) review, and make recommendations with respect to the numerical limita-
tions (and exemptions therefrom) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the
admission of permanent resident aliens;
(4) assess the social, economic, political, and demographic impact of previous
refugee programs and review the criteria for, and numerical limitations on, the
admission of refugees to the United States;
(5) conduct a comprehensive review of the provisions of the Immigration and
Nationality Act and make legislative recommendations to simplify and clarify such
provisions;
(6) make semiannual reports to each House of Congress during the period
before publication of its final report described in paragraph (7); and
(7) make a final report of its findings and recommendations to the President
and each House of Congress, which report shall be published not later than Septem-
ber 30, 1980.
Id. § 4(c)-4(d), 92 Stat. at 908.
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The most recent legislation enacted by Congress which has a
significant effect on immigration is the Refugee Act of 1980. s4 This
law establishes an annual allocation for the admission of 50,000
refugees in the years 1980, 1981, and 1982.55 It also authorizes the
President to make additional admissions in emergency situations,
after consultation with Congress. 5 While there are other changes
affecting refugees,5 7 the only modification pertaining to general
immigration law is the reduction, from 290,000 to 270,000, of the
total annual quota for immigration.5 8
It is hoped that this brief summary of the history of this
country's immigration policy illustrates the intricate nature of its
development. This field of law is often marred by fear and preju-
dice and is frequently affected by private interests.59  No clearer
example exists than our policies toward Mexican immigration. Mex-
ico continues to be a profitable source of labor for American busi-
ness interests and this is the primary reason for the renewed concern
about statutory limitations upon this resource.
II. THE BRACERO PROGRAM AND RELATED
TEMPORARY GUEST WORKER LEGISLATION
Regulated admission of temporary workers into the United
States began during World War II under the Bracero program
primarily as an emergency measure to replace manpower lost due
to the war. 60 This "state of emergency" lasted for 22 years. The
Bracero program, initially negotiated by treaty, admitted Mexican
54. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, 107 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1156 (Supp. 1980)).
55. Id. § 207(a)(1), 94 Stat. at 103.
56. Id. § 207(a)(2), 94 Stat. at 103-05.
57. C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 16, § 1.4g.
58. Id.
59. The best example of private interests directly affecting immigration law is found in
the controversial "Texas Proviso" discussed at notes 145-46 infra and accompanying text. See
generally notes 136-37 infra and accompanying text. One commentator has noted that
"[e]fforts to control illegal immigration have corresponded to the United States' ability to
absorb and profit from the efficient utilization and exploitation of undocumented aliens. The
transition from a relatively open to a closed border policy occurs in cycles depending on the
demands of the United States economy." See Comment, Employer Sanctions: The "New
Solution" To The Illegal Alien Problems, 1979 Afuz. ST. L.J. 439, 441 (footnote omitted)
[hereinafter cited as New Solution].
60. Agreement between the United States of America and Mexico respecting the tempo-
rary migration of Mexican agricultural workers, 56 Stat. 1759 (1942). New Solution, supra
note 59, at 441.
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"braceros" 6' to do farm work. The provisions of this treaty ex-
empted Mexican laborers from selective service registration and
certain requirements of immigration laws.6 2  Under the treaty, the
United States government provided round-trip transportation for
the laborers and insured that hours of work and wages were com-
mensurate with those of domestic workers.6 3  It was agreed that
Bracero workers would not be used to displace domestic laborers
but only to fill in during genuine shortages. 64
In April of 1943, Congress enacted the first of the Farm Labor
Supply Appropriations Acts.65 The 1943 act, while replacing the
treaty, continued the Bracero program and empowered the United
States to temporarily admit "native born residents of North Amer-
ica, South America, and Central America, and the islands adjacent
thereto, desiring to perform agricultural labor in the United
States" .... 6 It also provided government funds for recruitment,
transportation, medical expenses, subsistence, shelter, and place-
ment of agricultural workers.6 7 During the war period the federal
government was the prime contractor of bracero laborers.6 8  Ex-
emptions for Mexicans from our immigration laws instituted under
the Bracero program continued in effect under this act.69
After the war, the Bracero program was continued in a modi-
fied form through a series of treaties exclusively with Mexico. 70
61. "Bracero" was the term used to refer to Mexican temporary laborers. P. EHRLICH,
L. BILDERBACK & A. EHRLICH, THE GOLDEN DOOR 212 (1979).
62. 56 Stat. 1759, 1766. The Mexican laborers were exempted from literacy require-
ments as well as payment of head taxes or other admission charges. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st
Cong., 2nd Sess. 579 (1950).
63. Id. at 1767-68. Congressional Research Service, supra note 37, at 27.
64. Id. at 1766-68. The provision initiating the admission of Mexican laborers under the
Bracero program was the ninth proviso of section 3 of the Immigration Act of 1917. See
Congressional Research Service, supra note 37, at 27. The relationship between this section
and the Bracero program is at best tenuous because the proviso as drafted pertained only to
alien attendants working at expositions in this country. Immigration Act of 1917, 39 Stat. at
878.
65. Congressional Research Service, supra note 37, at 28. The Farm Labor Supply
Appropriations Acts ran from 1943-47. The other acts were: Act of June 30, 1947, ch. 165, 61
Stat. 202 (1947); Act of Dec. 28, 1945, ch. 589, title I, 59 Stat. 632 (1945); Act of Feb. 14,
1944, ch. 16, 58 Stat. 11 (1944). During these years, approximately $120 million in federal
funds was appropriated for the Bracero program. P. EHRLICH, L. BILDERBACK & A. EHRLICH,
supra note 61, at 213.
66. Act of Apr. 29, 1943, ch. 82, § 5(g), 57 Stat. 70, 73 (1943).
67.1d.
68. Id. at 71. P. EHRLICH, L. BILDERBACK & A. EHRLICH, supra note 61, at 212.
69. 56 Stat. 1759, 1766.
70. 57 Stat. at 73. The program was continued under international agreement specifi-
cally at the request of the Mexican government. Congressional Research Service, supra note
37, at 28.
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Under the modified program the United States employer was the
primary contractor and it was the United States employer who paid
all transportation and related expenses. 71 It was about this time
that problems inherent in the program were first discovered.
Charges were raised that American employers were not treating the
Mexican workers in accord with the terms of this agreement. The
quality of the living conditions and the level of wages were the
primary focus of the complaints. 72  Simultaneously, concern was
expressed in this country regarding the protection afforded domes-
tic farm workers under the terms of the program. 73
In response to these problems,7 4 Public Law 78 (P.L.-78) was
enacted .7  This statute and subsequent agreements with Mexico
established rigorous guidelines for employers of Mexican laborers. 76
Under P.L.-78 the United States government and employers shared
the costs of transporting the workers to this country. 77  The em-
ployer was required by the law to pay the Mexican worker not less
than the prevailing wage rate paid to domestic farm workers. 7
Finally, and possibly most importantly, P.L.-78 also provided that
the United States government would guarantee the performance by
71. Spradlin, The Mexican Farm Labor Important Program-Review and Reform, 30
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 84, 84 (1961).
72. Congressional Research Service, supra note 37, at 28.
73. Id. There were also reports that Mexican workers were leaving their places of
employment in violation of their employment contracts. Spradlin, supra note 71, at 85.
74. Congressional Research Service, supra note 37, at 29.
75. Agricultural Act of 1949 Amendments, 65 Stat. 119 (1951). Note that Bracero
workers were limited by P.L.-78 to agricultural labor.
76. Section 503 of the Act states:
No workers recruited under this title shall be available for employment in any
area unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified that (1) sufficient
domestic workers who are able, willing, and qualified are not available at the time
and place needed to perform the work for which such workers are to be employed,
(2) the employment of such workers will not adversely affect the wages and working
conditions of domestic agricultural workers similarly employed, and (3) reasonable
efforts have been made to attract domestic workers for such employment at wages
and standard hours of work comparable to those offered to foreign workers.
Id. The significance of this terminology will be discussed at notes 120-134 infra and accompa-
nying text. For additional requirements see 2 U.S.T. 1940, 1987-95.
77. The United States government was to pay the cost of transportation from recruit-
ment centers in the United States. The employer was to pay the cost of transportation from
the reception center to the work site. 65 Stat. at 119.
78. International Executive Agreement Covering the Employment of Mexican Agricul-
tural Workers, and Individual Work Contracts, Aug. 1, 1949, 2 U.S.T. 1048, 1056 T.I.A.S.
No. 2260.
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employers of the provisions of the agreement. 71 P.L.-78 was the
basic law that was applied to the admission of Mexican labor for
the duration of the Bracero program. P.L.-78 continued largely
unchanged throughout the 1950's,80 until the end of the decade
when opposition to the program increased. It was felt that the
Bracero program adversely affected domestic workers who were
competing with Mexican labor for jobs.8 Subsequent extensions of
P.L.-78 attempted to remedy this problem by establishing "ad-
verse-effect rates" for foreign workers.82  "Adverse-effect rates" set
minimum wages that could be paid by employers to Mexican
workers.8 3  Nevertheless, the problem continued and may have
worsened as admission of braceros for the period of the late 1950's
to early 1960's averaged about 400,000 persons. 84
The Bracero program was allowed to lapse in 196485 because
of the effect it had on domestic labor in general and, more specifi-
cally, upon migrant agricultural workers.86 The Bracero program
was also suspected of being a significant cause of illegal immigra-
tion. Many more Mexicans wanted to come into this country than
could be admitted under the program.8 7  Thus, in the minds of its
critics, the program took jobs away from willing citizens while also
exacerbating illegal immigration .88
79. Section 501 of the Act states, in pertinent part:
For the purpose of assisting in such production of agricultural commodities and
poducts as the Secretary of Agriculture deems necessary, by supplying agricultural
workers from the Republic of Mexico . . .the Secretary of Labor is authorized...
(6) to guarantee the performance by employers of provisions of such contracts
relating to the payment of wages or the furnishing of transportation.
65 Stat. at 119.
80. Congressional Research Service, supra note 37, at 36-40.
81. Id. at 40-41.
82. Id. at 41.
83. Id.
84. M. BARRERA, RACE AND CLASS IN THE SOUTHWEST 117 (1979).
85. "The Bracero program was terminated in 1964 because of farmers' dissatisfaction
with the management of the program and pressure by labor unions that claimed imported
labor was taking jobs away from their members." New Solution, supra note 59, at 442.
Indeed, the pressure exerted by labor unions is a factor mentioned by those involved in the
currently proposed guest worker program. Joseph Chougassian, a senior policy adviser at the
White House, has noted the considerable pressure brought against the Bracero .program by
labor unions and has stated that, "a sound public relations program could deal effectively
with any initial opposition". Guest Worker Article, supra note 3.
86. The poor living conditions, working conditions, low pay and high unemployment
experienced by migrant farm workers are vividly detailed in Spradlin, supra note 71, 97.
87. See New Solution, supra note 59, at 441-43.
88. For additional information on the Bracero program, see R. CRAIc, THE BRAcERo
PROGRAM: INTEREST GROUPS AND FOREIGN POLICY (1971).
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With the lapse of the Bracero program, Mexican citizens wish-
ing to work in the United States were, for the most part, denied a
legal method of entry. 89 Currently, the only provision permitting
admission of temporary workers into the United States is the H-2
program. The H-2 program grants admission to "[a]n alien having
a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of
abandoning ... who is coming temporarily to the United States to
perform temporary services or labor, if unemployed persons capa-
ble of performing such service or labor cannot be found in this
country ... ."90 Before an alien may be admitted under this sec-
tion, the Secretary of Labor must certify that their is a shortage of
similar laborers in the United States and that employment of the
alien would have no adverse affect on working conditions in the
United States."' The H-2 program was initially designed to paral-
lel the Bracero program.92 Indeed, the H-2 program was designed
to and still does exclude, with few exceptions, Mexicans from its
provisions. 93  Since the termination of the Bracero program in
1965, no viable legal channel of immigration has been available for
Mexican workers living in the United States for an extended period
of time. Despite the lack of legal authorization, thousands of Mexi-
cans continue to enter the United States to seek temporary employ-
ment. This is precisely the problem that the President's proposals on
immigration are designed to control.
III. EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
A. Introduction
If enacted, President Reagan's proposals would effectuate the
most extensive revision of United States immigration law since 1978
and quite probably since 1965. The component of the program,
which would potentially have the greatest impact in terms of the
number of persons affected, would be that part which would grant
89. With few exceptions, all nonimmigrants are precluded from seeking employment in
the United States unless specifically granted permission to engage in employment. Permission
may be granted by a district director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The
exceptions to the rule prohibiting employment of nonimmigrants are listed in C. GORDON &
E. GORDON, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONAL LAW § 6.16(a) (abr. ed. 1979).
90. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii) (1976).
91. E. HARPER, supra note 18, at 299.
92. Congressional Research Service, supra note 37, at 42.
93. Id.
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legal status to all illegal aliens living in the United States before
January 1, 1980.14  This provision would grant permanent resident
alien status to Cuban and Haitian aliens residing in the United
States for a period of five years.9 5  For all other illegal aliens, the
applicable waiting period would be ten years. 6  Permanent resi-
dent aliens are eligible to apply for citizenship after living in the
United States for five years.9 7
The two other controversial provisions of the President's pro-
posal would provide for the establishment of a guest worker pro-
gram and the imposition of sanctions against employers who know-
ingly hire illegal aliens.98 Under the guest worker program, a
maximum of 50,000 Mexican citizens who have no intention of
renouncing their Mexican citizenship would be allowed to enter
and work in this country during each year of the two year program.
These guest workers would work only in areas where domestic
labor was in short supply, and like the Bracero program, the Mexi-
can guest workers would be located only in those states and indus-
tries where their labor was needed.99 While sanctions against em-
ployers for hiring illegal aliens in the form of fines are not new,100
such penalties would be novel to federal immigration law.
94. See text accompanying notes 11 and 12 supra.
95. President's Program, supra note 7, at 4.
96. Id.
97. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1976) states:
No person, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, shall be natural-
ized unless such petitioner, (1) immediately preceding the date of filing his petition
for naturalization has resided continuously, after being lawfully admitted for per-
manent residence, within the United States for at least five years and during the five
years immediately preceding the date of filing his petition has been physically
present therein for periods totaling at least half of that time, and who has resided
within the State in which the petitioner filed the petition for at least six months, (2)
has resided continuously within the United States from the date of the petition up to
the time of admission to citizenship, and (3) during all the period referred to in this
subsection has been and still is a person of good moral character, attached to the
principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good
order and happiness of the United States.
98. See notes 7 and 8 supra and accompanying text. Recall that the initial treaty
between the United States and Mexico for the admission of temporary workers expressly
provided that such workers should not displace domestic workers. See notes 60-64 supra and
accompanying text.
99. President's Program, supra note 7, at 5.
100. Some states, most notably California, have had similar statutes for several years.
See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805 (West Supp. 1981).
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The remaining provisions of the President's proposed program
are less significant. They include spending $40 million on improve-
ment of border patrol facilities'01 and doubling the present per
country immigration quota for Canada and Mexico of 20,000 per-
sons.102  Finally, the President has also proposed improving proce-
dures for determining the eligibility for asylum so that the increased
number of asylum petitions might be processed quickly.10 3
The general grant of legal status is little more than a grant of
amnesty. It is not a wholly acceptable solution because in effect it
sanctions illegal immigration. It may also provide an incentive for
illegal immigration because many Mexicans may decide to immi-
grate before the President's proposals become effective. 0 4  It is,
however, a practical solution to the probem of illegal immigration
by Mexicans.105 Detection and deportation of the millions of illegal
aliens in this country are virtually impossible. 0 These persons are
dispersed throughout our country in such numbers as to preclude
deportation as a viable option.10 7 Furthermore, despite complaints
that illegal aliens hurt the economy by taking jobs from American
citizens, they are also consumers who contribute to the economy.108
Finally, Cuban and Haitian refugees are treated differently under
101. Attorney General's statement, supra note 10, at 5.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. It has been recommended that those aliens who do not meet the January 1, 1980
residence requirement be granted a special temporary status which would eventually allow
these persons to adjust to permanent resident status. 127 CONG. REC. S1689, S1690 (daily ed.
Feb. 27, 1981) (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy on Report of the Select Commission
on Immigration Policy).
105. Comprehensive recommendations for the control of Mexican illegal immigration
can be found in W. TONEY, A DESCRIPTIVE STUDY OF THE CONTROL OF ILLEGAL MEXICAN
MIGRATION IN THE SOUTHWESTERN U.S. at 69-78 (1977).
106. The government's inability to even estimate the number of illegal aliens presently
in this country underscores the difficulty of the problem. See Manulkin & Maghame, A
Proposed Solution to the Problem of the Undocumented Mexican Alien Worker, 13 SAN
DIGO L. Ray. 42, 45 (1975).
107. Go to New York City or to Los Angeles and you will find these people
working in sweat shops like those not seen in this country since the 1920s.
[Illegal aliens] are not working in the fields anymore. These 6 to 8 million
people are competing today across the spectrum of skills. They are in rail-
roads, they are in the hotels, they are in restaurants, they are in the garment
industry, but very few are in agriculture.
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, SHOULD U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY
BE CHANGED? 8 (1980) (remarks of Mr. Otero).
108. New Solution, supra note 59, at 454.
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this provision primarily because of the circumstances of their mi-
gration to the United States.
B. The Mexican Guest Worker Program
The guest worker program is comparatively minor in scope yet
it is the focal point of much of the criticism directed at the Presi-
dent's proposals. Questions have been raised regarding the means
of determining where domestic labor is in short supply and by what
means a shortage is to be determined. 0 9 There have also been
questions about the size and duration of the program and the
government's ability to measure its impact upon domestic em-
ployees." 0 The last and possibily most important shortcoming
noted by critics of the program is the lack of a viable procedure for
distinguishing guest worker aliens, legal resident aliens and citizens
from illegal aliens.' 1
The admission of Mexican guest workers under the President's
proposal only when domestic labor is in short supply implies some
form of governmental determination that a shortage exists. Presum-
ably, the procedure will be somewhat similar to that used in related
legislation. 1 2  Several bills introduced into the present session of
Congress address this issue of "labor certification"'" 3 in different
ways. For example, Senate Bill 47 (Schmitt Bill) allows the Attor-
ney General to control the certification process." 4  The Schmitt
Bill also places the power to establish restrictions upon the employ-
ment of guest worker aliens in the hands of the Attorney General.
Under this proposal an employer or employee may show the Attor-
ney General that the use of Mexican guest workers will displace
domestic labor." 5  In determining the number of Mexicans to be
109. See text accompanying notes 112-34 infra.
110. See text accompanying notes 142-44 infra.
111. See text accompanying notes 152-62 infra.
112. See text accompanying notes 90-92 supra.
113. This is the term generally used in reference to the process which determines the
availability of domestic labor. See, e.g., Rubin & Mancini, An Overview of the Labor
Certification Requirement for Intending Immigrants, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 76 (1976).
114. The Attorney General, upon request from the Secretary of Labor, shall place
specific restrictions on employment of aliens holding temporary work visas under this pro-
gram at a specific business or agricultural site if employees or employers demonstrate that
such aliens will displace available, qualified, and willing domestic workers. The Secretary of
Labor shall establish the criteria under which such restrictions may be requested. S. 47, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(f) (19810,
115. Id.
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admitted as temporary workers, the Attorney General may seek
help from the Secretaries of Labor, Agriculture and Commerce." 6
The Attorney General may also consider the historical needs of a
particular market." 7  The bill also uses terminology employed in
the labor certification process. 18 It allows the Attorney General to
"place specific restrictions on employment of aliens. . . at a specific
business or agricultural site if employees or employers demonstrate
that such aliens will displace available, qualified, and willing do-
mestic workers."1 9 This language is important because it requires
other factors, including desire to work and desirability for employ-
ment, be considered in determining whether a shortage of domestic
labor exists.
In the House of Representatives, H.R. 156 (Burgener Bill) is
one bill that most closely resembles what the final labor certifica-
tion procedure should be. 20  The Burgener Bill provides that the
Secretary of Labor shall make all required certifications.' 2' Again,
it must be certified thatr insufficient domestic workers are "able,
willing, and qualified."'122  However, the Secretary must also cer-
tify that the admission of guest worker aliens will have no adverse
affect on the wage rate of domestic workers. 2 3  Similar certifica-
tion procedures are found in H.R. 619 (Shumway Bill), in which it
is the Secretary of Agriculture who is authorized to certify that
employment of guest workers in a particular area will not affect
wages for domestic labor in that area. 1 4
116. "When appropriate, the Attorney General shall seek the assistance of the Secretary
of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Labor ... in computing the
annual and monthly numerical quotas for temporary worker visas ..... Id. § 3(g).
117. "In computing such quotas, the Attorney General shall also consider historical
needs, availability of domestic labor, and the projected needs of prospective employers." Id.
118. See note 113 supra and accompanying text.
119. See note 114 supra (emphasis added). Another bill, S. 930, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981) (Hayakawa Bill), uses essentially the same approach.
120. H.R. 156, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
121. Id. § 3(a).
122. Id.
123. It is required that the Secretary of labor certify that "the employment of such alien
will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers similarly em-
ployed .. ." Id.
124. H.R. 619, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § (a) (1981). Another piece of legislation, H.R.
1073, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1981) (Hinson Bill), sets forth basically the same proce-
dure. It requires the Secretary of Labor to certify:
That (I) sufficient domestic workers who are able, willing, and qualified are
not available at the time and place needed to perform the work for which such
worker is to be employed, and (II) the employment of such alien will not adversely
affect the wages and working conditions of workers similarly employed ....
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One other noteworthy piece of legislation introduced during
the current session of Congress is H.R. 1650 (Lungren Bill).' 25  This
bill amends the Immigration and Nationality Act to provide for a
guest worker program whose size would be based upon the number
of workers sought by employers.' 26  In regulating the flow of
guestworkers into the United States, the Attorney General would
consider historical needs, domestic availability and employer
needs.' 27  The Attorney General, along with the Secretary of La-
bor, could then impose restrictions on the employment of Mexican
guest workers if employers or employees demonstrated that these
aliens would displace domestic labor.'2 8  Because it is not wise to
leave control over the admission of guest workers to those who will
employ them,12 9 it is not likely that this bill will be enacted.
The law codifying the President's program is likely to incorpo-
rate elements of one or more of these legislative proposals. How-
ever, the use of the terminology, "able, willing, and qualified", or
words to that effect, may cause problems in implementation. For
example, the Department of Labor has rarely looked past its unem-
ployment files in determining whether domestic labor was able,
willing and qualified under the basic statute determining the ad-
missability of alien temporary workers.' 30  This in effect created a
125. H.R. 1650, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
126. Id. § 4(e)(2).
127. Id.
128. Id. § 4(e)(3).
129. History indicates that unscrupulous employers will exploit guest workers as much
as possible to gain the maximum benefit from their employment. See text accompanying note
72 supra.
130. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1976) which lists the general classes of excludable aliens
states:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the following classes of aliens
shall be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded from admission into the
United States.
Aliens seeking to enter the United States, for the purpose of performing skilled
or unskilled labor, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the
Secretary of State and the Attorney General that (A) there are not sufficient workers
who are able, willing, qualified (or equally qualified in the case of aliens who are
members of the teaching profession or who have exceptional ability in The sciences
or the arts), and available at the time of application for a visa and admission to the
United States and at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled
labor, and (B) the employment of such aliens will not adversely affect the wages and
working conditions of the workers in the United States similarly employed. . ..
(emphasis added). Analysis of this statute indicates little concern for the willingness of
domestic labor to perform the job. See Rodino, The Impact of Immigration on the American
Labor Market, 27 RuTcEes L. REv. 245, 245-46 (1974).
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policy on the part of the Department to concentrate upon the
availability of similar workers while ignoring the willingness is-
sue.131 If this type of language is used in the President's program, a
similar problem may result in making an accurate estimate of
domestic labor resources.
Regardless of the terminology used, a problem exists in accu-
rately determining the total number of domestic workers "avail-
able" in a given area at a given time. Certainly, an areawide
standard is preferable to a nationwide or statewide standard in that
it simplifies whatever procedure is used to determine "availabil-
ity". 132 Discrepancies arising regarding the "availability" of do-
mestic workers could best be resolved by the courts.133  Given the
difficulty in determining "availability" of domestic workers,134 it
would seem that the burden of proof should be placed on those
alleging the existence of sufficient domestic labor.
The functional portion of the guest worker program permits
50,000 Mexican citizens who have no intention of relinquishing
their Mexican citizenship to live and work in the United States each
year for a period of two years. 135  This part of the guest worker
131. Construed this way, the statute fails to accomplish the purpose for which it was
enacted. The statute is not concerned with any worker in this country who may be adversely
affected. The statute was aimed at protesting those United States workers who live and work
in the same community as the alien intends to live and work in, and further, to those United
States workers who are "able," "willing," "qualified" and "available" for that particular job.
MANULKIN & MAGHAME, supra note 106, at 53.
132. H.R. 620, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), would amend 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)
(1976) to provide explicitly for an areawide standard.
133. Courts have a pattern of involvement in review of labor certification denials. C.
Co DON & H. ROSENIELD, supra note 16, § 3.6i.
134. See notes 130-33 supra and accompanying text.
135. President's Program, supra note 7, at 5. The size of the program would seem
primarily a concession to those political interests, such as organized labor, that oppose the
idea of a guest worker program. It is believed that the Mexican government wanted a much
larger program. Weisman Article, supra note 2, at AIO, col. 1. President Reagan, while
campaign for election, called for a guest worker program in the hundreds of thousands.
Guest Worker Article, supra note 3, at Al.
The President's proposal makes of mention of the length of time that Mexican aliens may
remain in the United States during the pendency of the program. Presumably, each guest
worker would be allowed to stay and work in this country for an entire year. Several of the
previously mentioned pieces of legislation deal specifically with the legal duration of a guest
worker's stay in this country. S. 47, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(e)(1) (1981) would allow
Mexican guest workers to stay in the United States 240 days per year. S. 930, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 5(a) (1981) would only allow guest workers to stay 180 days per year while H.R. 944,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102(m)(i) (1981) (White Bill) would allow them to stay for the entire
year.
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program has aroused strong criticism from organized labor. Labor
leaders argue that the program will take jobs from domestic
workers and weaken the power of unions in those areas where guest
workers are employed. 13 These arguments ignore the fact that the
certification procedure, whatever form it ultimately takes, will be
designed specifically to prevent the program from adversely affect-
ing the domestic labor market. 137  As to the allegation that the
guest worker program is anti-union, there are insufficient facts
available to substantiate this claim. 138
Mexican-Americans have criticized the Reagan program as
being tantamount to "institutionalized serfdom". 39  They fear that
participants in the guest worker program would be subject to the
abuses and exploitation of unscrupulous employers. 140  It has also
been noted that guest workers in programs in other countries have
decided to stay on in the host country after termination of the
program.14 1  While this criticism may be well-founded in some
isolated circumstances, the overall thrust of the President's program
is to eliminate the far greater problem of exploitation of illegal
aliens throughout the United States.
136. It has been established that the Bracero program was used to undermine attempts
at farm unionization. M. BARanaA, supra note 84, at 118. The purpose of the guest worker
program, however, is not to compete with union laborers but rather to supplement them
when there are more jobs available than there are domestic union workers to fill them. See
generally 127 CONG. REc. 560 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1981) (remarks of Sen. Schmitt).
137. The certification procedure, along with sanctions on employers knowingly hiring
illegal aliens, are measures created to protect domestic labor. See generally 127 CONG. REc.
S59 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1981) (remarks of Sen. Schmitt).
138. To argue that the guest worker program will be used, as was the Bracero program,
to thwart union organizing efforts is to make an assumption without a sufficient basis in fact.
It also ignores federal labor law which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
interfere in union organizing efforts. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
139. NEwswxEK, August 3, 1981, at 25.
140. The [present] law is not enforceable, and a substantial number of people
enter without inspection, without documents, and live to some extent in an
underground economy. To some degree, they become an underclass. They
are not only exploited at the work place, . . . but criminals also prey upon
them. Some do not report their health problems or even send their children
to school, which is a very bad thing for the United States of America.
American Enterprise Insitute for Public Policy Research, SHOULD U.S. IMMI-
GRATION POLICY BE CHANGED?, supra note 107, at 4.
141. Guest Worker Article, supra note 3, at B8. Switzerland, Germany, France and
Sweden have had guest worker programs and in those countries guest workers have tended to
become permanent. Martin & Miller, Guestworkers: Lessons From Western Europe, 33
INDUS. & LAB. REL. 315, 329 (1980).
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The proposed guest worker program can also be criticized as
being too small to have a measurable effect upon illegal immigra-
tion. The history of the Bracero program indicates that only after
many years and the admission of hundreds of thousands of Bracero
laborers did its inadequacies become clear. 142  Obviously, the ad-
mission of 50,000 Mexicans each year for a period of two years will
do little to diminish the flow of illegal aliens. 143  Therefore it is
doubtful that the program as it is now planned will truly be an
effective and reasonable program for the economic benefit of Mexi-
can citizens. 44  The guest worker program will do little to resolve
the problem of hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants coming
into this country from Mexico each year. There will probably be
few claims that employers are subjecting the guest workers to sub-
standard wages and working hours but, in light of all of the pro-
gram's other problems, the importance of this factor is suspect.
C. Employer Sanctions
The concept of sanctions for employers who knowingly and
willfully hire illegal aliens is not new. Such a provision was pro-
posed in one version of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952. 4' However, an extensive lobbying campaign conducted by
business interests resulted in the addition of a proviso exempting
employers from sanctions imposed against those who "harbored"
illegal aliens. 146  Additionally, Congress has debated the concept in
142. See notes 80-88 supra and accompanying text. See generally Hadley, A Critical
Analysis of the Wetback Problems, 21 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 334, 344 (1956); Congressio-
nal Research Service, supra note 37, at 40.
143. By its own estimate, the Reagan Administration admits that illegal immigration
into this country is at least ten times the size of the proposed program. Crewdson, Plan on
Immigration: Lack of a Way to Detect Illegal Aliens May Hamper New Reagan Proposals,
N.Y. Times, July 31, 1981, at A12, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Immigration Plan].
144. In his official statement on immigration and refugee policy, President Reagan
noted that "[wie must also recognize that both the United States and Mexico have historically
benefited from Mexicans obtaining employment in the United States." 17 WEEKLY COMP. OF
PpEs. Doc. 829, 830 (July 30, 1981). It is not clear how this limited program can meaning-
fully diminish Mexican unemployment. Surely, the Mexican government does not perceive
this program as being much help since they lobbied strongly for a much larger program. N.Y.
Times, June 8, 1981, at A10, col. 6.
145. 98 CONG. REC. 802-13 (1952) (remarks of Sen. Douglas). See New Solution, supra
note 59, at 441-42; Congressional Research Service, supra note 37, at 36.
146. Commonly known as the "Texas Proviso", it was codified into 8 U.S.C. § 1324a
(1976) which states, in relevant part, "Provided, however, that for the purposes of this
section, employment (including the usual and normal practices incident to employment) shall
not be deemed to constitute harboring."
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one form or another for over ten years. 147  President Reagan's
proposal would impose fines of five hundred to one thousand dol-
lars for each illegal alien hired. 148  Injunctions could also be im-
posed against those employers who show a "pattern or practice" 1 49
of hiring illegal aliens.
The President's proposal eschews criminal penalties for the
employment of illegal aliens premised on the belief that criminal
penalties are less likely to be enforced and would result in lengthy
and expensive court cases. 150  Two bills introduced into the present
session of Congress, however, advocate imprisonment for em-
ployers who knowingly hire illegal aliens. 51  Although somewhat
impractical, criminal penalties may be the only way to substan-
tially decrease the flow of illegal aliens from Mexico. A policy
favoring enforcement of criminal penalties would clarify to em-
ployers the consequences of employing illegal aliens. It would also
effectively diminish the "push-pull" factor 52 of illegal Mexican
immigration because there would be fewer jobs to attract illegal
immigrants to this country.
D. National Identification Cards
To succeed, it is essential that the President's proposal include
some procedure for distinguishing legal Mexican aliens and citizens
from illegal aliens. During the preparation of this program, the
White House staff considered and subsequently ruled out establish-
147. Employer Sanctions, supra note 11, at 680.
148. See note 8 supra and accompanying text. Again for the purpose of comparison, the
sanctions proposed are similar to those mentioned in S. 930, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10(d)(2)
(1981), which fines an employer $500 for each violation.
149. Id.
150. Employer Sanctions, supra note 11, at 684-85.
151. H.R. 1073, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1981) states, "(c) Any person who employs an
alien and who knows that the alien is not permitted to be employed in the United States shall
be fined not less than $1,000 and not more than $25,000, or imprisoned for not more than
five years, or both, for each such alien so employed." H.R. 1965, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981)
provides:
(c) Whoever knowingly employs for compensation any individual the employing
person knows is an alien not duly admitted by an immigration officer or not
lawfully entitled to enter or reside within the United States under the terms of this
Act or any other law relating to the immigration or expulsion of aliens shall be fined
not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than one year.
152. "The basic theory used to explain why Mexicans come to the United States illegally
is the push-pull theory. The theory is simple: Depressed economic conditions at home push
Mexicans toward the border, and the lure of jobs and high wages pulls them toward the
United States." New Solution, supra note 59, at 450-51 (footnote omitted).
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ment of a national identity card system. 53  The primary reason
stated for this decision was that the total cost of the development
and implementation of such a system would be prohibitive.15 4
However, the Reagan Administration's concern about public fears
of over-regulation and the potential for abuse may have also been
factors which militated against adopting such a system.1 55
Most arguments for the establishment of a national identity
card call for what is merely a modified Social Security card. 56 Such
a card would require little more information than that found on the
average driver's license. '57  The card would be made of "forge-
proof" paper similar to that used in printing currency. 58 Civil
libertarians oppose a national identity card because they fear that
the card will lead to over-regulation which in turn will lead to some
form of police state. 59 Such critics ignore the fact that the govern-
153. See Immigration Plan, supra note 143, at A12.
154. Id.
155. The President, in his official statement on the topic, stressed that no part of the
proposal should conflict with individual privacy and freedom. 17 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES.
Doc. at 829 (July 30, 1981). Senator Kennedy has also expressed opposition to the national
identification card, perceiving this document as a threat to personal privacy and civil
liberties. 127 CONG. REC. S1690 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1981).
156. See H.R. 156, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). As Rep. Don Bonker has noted that
"[tlhe Social Security Act has always required that all gainfully employed people have a
social security number and that this number be given to the employer. Thus, the basic system
for controlling employment eligibility through a single document is already in place." 127
CONG. REc. EIOO0 (daily ed. March 11, 1981) (remarks of Rep. Bonker). See generally W.
FOGEL, MEXICAN ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE UNITED STATES 112-75 (INSTITUTE OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS Monograph No. 20, 1979).
157. Actually, little information about the individual is required. H.R. 156, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a)(2) (1981), would have the modified Social Security Card contain the
individual's name, signature, date of issuance of the card, and the expiration date of the card.
158. The solution to discrimination against Hispanics and to the enforcement of a ban
on hiring illegal aliens generally would seem to be the use of a work card which would
establish the holder's legal eligibility for employment. Because all workers would be required
to have a card, and because the possession of the card would establish work eligibility, there
could be no discrimination against Hispanics who are citizens or legal resident aliens. It
would be logical to adapt the existing social security card for this purpose, because almost all
workers must now have one and almost all employers are required to record its number for
their employee's social security account. The new social security card would have to be
counterfeit-proof, non-transferable, and it could not be issued to illegal aliens. Fogel, Illegal
Aliens: Economic Aspects and Public Policy Alternatives, 15 SAN .DIEGo L. REv. 63, 77
(1977).
159. "Arguments against a standardized national ID [include] beliefs that such docu-
mentation is in opposition to American tradition and would represent an invasion of personal
privacy, and that data required for citizen identification could be abused by government or
private interests." STAFF OF SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
REPORT ON THE CRIMINAL USE OF FALSE IDENTIFICATION at 75 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as FACFI]. See New Solution, supra note 59, at 463.
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ment already has most of the information which would be needed
to enforce the program.
Without the national identification card, employers hiring
Hispanic laborers would have to rely upon traditional methods of
identification to determine whether a particular individual is in this
country legally.160 The problem with these forms of identification
is that they are easily forged.' 6 Under the Reagan proposal, em-
ployers would have to certify that they had no reason to doubt a
prospective employee's representations that he is lawfully in the
United States.' 6 2 Unfortunately, all this may mean is that the
employer is certifying that he cannot detect a forgery.
The effect of this failure to provide for an identification proce-
dure is that the entire sanction concept, along with the guest
worker program, may be rendered wholly ineffective as a means of
controlling illegal immigration. There would seem to be few in-
stances where an employer would have to resort to knowingly
hiring illegal aliens. Even then, the Attorney General has made it
clear that these sanctions will be used only against those who hire
significant numbers of illegal aliens. 6 3  Thus, the President's pro-
gram seems designed to catch not those who are foolish enough to
hire illegal aliens, but rather only those who are foolish enough to
do so several times.
E. Miscellaneous Provisions
The other, less controversial changes in immigration policy
proposed by the President are likely to be of little help in controlling
illegal immigration. The $40 million proposed allocation to im-
prove the Border Patrol is really more of a symbol than a solution.
160. The Administration said that employers could meet their legal responsibility in this
respect by examining any two of the following documents: a birth certificate, a driver's
license, a Social Security Card or a draft registration certificate issued by the Selective Service
System. President's Program, supra note 4, at A12.
161. See, e.g., FACFI, supra note 159, at 79-83; New Solution, supra note 59, at 463.
"While the administration has sought to diminish fears of potential violations of privacy that
could accompany the transformation of the social security card into a national identification
card, the government may find this spectre less threatening than the consequences of the
continued influx of illegal aliens." Employer Sanctions, supra note 11, at 685-86 (footnote
omitted).
162. President's Program, supra note 7, at 5.
163. Under the President's proposal, the sanctions would not apply to businesses with
three or fewer employees. President's Program, supra note 4, at Al. More importantly, the
Attorney General has given assurances that sanctions would be imposed only against those
who hire significant numbers of illegal aliens. Immigration Plan, supra note 143, at A12.
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Past attempts to halt illegal immigrants at the border met with only
temporary success. 16 4 It has been noted that the only truly effective
method to police our border with Mexico is to place soldiers shoul-
der to shoulder along its entire 2,000 mile length.'"5 More Border
Patrol guards and facilities may delay but will not deter the average
illegal immigrant from entering this country undetected. 66  A
more logical alternative would be to remove any motive for illegal
immigration, thus removing the need for a large and expensive
Border Patrol. 16 7
The President's proposal for increasing the quota for Mexico
and Canada would also create a special exception to the world-
wide limit of 20,000 persons per country. 68 This proposal would
double the quotas for both countries, creating a total immigration
"pool" of 80,000 persons. 16  Since Canada traditionally has not
used all of its allotment, Mexico would be allowed to "borrow"
from the unused Canadian allocation.170  Although this part of the
Reagan proposal would have an impact upon illegal immigration,
it would be too small to markedly diminish illegal immigration.'17
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Though significant structural differences exist, 72 the results of
the President's proposal may not vary greatly from those obtained
under the Bracero program. The guest worker program, like the
Bracero program, may provide an impetus for illegal immigration
164. P. EHRLICH, L. BILDERBACK & A. EHRLICH, supra note 61, at 214-17. The operation
to shut down the Mexican border, called "Operation Wetback," turned the Border Patrol of
the 1950s into a small army. New Solution, supra note 59, at 441. However, critics note that
"Operation Wetback" alone could not have caused the dramatic reduction in illegal immi-
gration. Congressional Research Service, supra note 37, at 37-39.
165. Immigration Plan, supra note 143, at A12.
166. See G. HALSELL, THE ILLEGALS 18 (1978).
167. "By removing the lure of jobs in the United States, the incentive for illegal
immigration would be greatly diminished." 127 CON.. REC. E1001 (daily ed, March 11,
1981) (remarks of Rep. Bonker).
168. See text accompanying notes 50 and 51 supra.
169. President's Program, supra note 7, at 6.
170. Id.
171. See note 143 supra and accompanying text.
172. The most important difference is that the President's proposal would not tie
Mexican workers to a specific employer, as was done in the Bracero program. Temporary
guest workers would be allowed to move into those industries in which they are needed. As
extensive comparison of the Bracero program to the President's program is beyond the
purpose of this note. However, such a comparison may be initiated by examining Spradlin,
supra note 71, at 87-95.
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by permitting 100,000 Mexicans to live in the United States and
develop both relationships and a general affinity for life in this
country.173  Because the number of Mexican immigrants allowed
into this country is comparatively small and the methods for illegal
entry are easier than those of legal entry. 174  It would not be
surprising that most would opt for illegal immigration.
The President's proposal is, however, a sincere attempt to deal
with the problem of illegal Mexican immigration. The crucial flaw
in the proposal is that its provisions are too timid to alter established
patterns of illegal immigration. For the guest worker program not
to adversely affect domestic labor it must be small in scope.17 5
However, this means that the program will be too small to affect
illegal immigration. Thus, even if the President's program is en-
acted it is likely to have minimal impact upon illegal immigration.
The Reagan proposal is also seriously flawed because it does
not provide for an effective identification procedure. Employer
sanctions are established under the proposal but are applied only if
the employer has reason to believe the prospective employee is an
illegal alien.17  However, it is all too easy for illegal aliens to dispel
any lingering doubts as to the legality of their presence by purchas-
ing cheap and accessable forged identification. 77  Consequently,
the program may in fact prove a greater catalyst for illegal immi-
gration than even the Bracero program.
This is not to say that the President's proposal is totally lacking
in worthwhile qualities. The establishment of civil penalties on
173. As noted earlier, history illustrates that guest workers will develop social and
economic ties that lead them to prefer life in the United States. See note 141 supra and
accompanying text.
174. Presently, Mexico is still subject to the per country limitation of 20,000 persons.
Even if this limitation is doubled, as the President suggests, this would still not dramatically
affect the illegal immigration problem. As to the ease of illegal entry, it is only necessary to
note that the maximum amount of Border Patrol officers on duty on the 2,000 mile Mexican
Border at any one time is 350, or about one for every 5.7 miles. The Select Commission on
Immigration and Refugee Policy conducted extensive research on this entire area and devel-
oped conclusions and proposals similar to those of President Reagan. See EXECUTIVE SUM-
MARY-REOMMENDATIONS OF THE SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POL-
icy, reprinted in 127 CONG. REC. S1686 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1981).
175. "Adverse effect" in this instance may be more properly termed as "perceived
adverse effect" on the part of labor unions. Although there seems to be a consensus as to the
effect of the Bracero program on domestic labor, disagreement exists as to the impact of
illegal immigration today on wages and job displacement. Employer Sanctions, supra note
11, at 665-67.
176. See text accompany note 162 supra.
177. See note 161 supra and accompanying text.
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employers who knowingly hire illegal aliens has been long overdue.
Unfortunately, the method of enforcement proposed by the Attor-
ney General fails to give employer sanctions their proper effect.17 8
The President's proposal would be highly effective if the method for
identification of illegal aliens was improved and if sanctions were
strongly enforced. Mexican citizens would then know, prior to
immigrating illegally that their chances of finding the "good life" in
the United States were slim. Also, if the sanctions were more costly,
employers would not risk hiring illegal aliens under most circum-
stances, much less establish a pattern or practice of doing so. 179
Although it is true that no program can eliminate all illegal immi-
gration, 80 the President's proposal is likely to do little, if anything,
to change the trends of illegal Mexican immigration established
over the past forty years.
Michael F. Turansick
178. See note 163 supra and accompanying text.
179. See note 148 supra and accompanying text.
180. Rev. Theodore M. Hesburgh, head of the Select Commission on Immigration and
Refugee Policy, has stated:
No one on this Commission expects to stop illegal migration totally or believes
that new enforcement measures can be instituted without cost. But we do believe
that we can reduce illegal entries sharply, and that the social costs of not doing so
may be grave. What is a serious problem today, could become a monumental crisis
as migration pressures increase.
127 CONG. REc. S1685 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1981).
